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Abstract—In this letter, we investigate the dynamic network
service provider (SP) and service selection in an intelligent
reflecting surface (IRS)-assisted wireless network. In the network,
mobile users select different network resources, i.e., transmit
power and IRS resources, provided by different SPs. To analyze
the SP and network service selection of the users, we formulate
an evolutionary game. In the game, the users (players) adjust
their selections of the SPs and services based on their utilities. We
model the SP and service adaptation of the users by the replicator
dynamics and analyze the equilibrium of the evolutionary game.
Extensive simulations are provided to demonstrate consistency
with the analytical results and the effectiveness of the proposed
game approach.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface, evolutionary game,
network selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
To improve the spectrum and energy efficiency of the
forthcoming and future wireless networks (5G and beyond),
network service providers (SPs) have investigated and de-
ployed several innovation technologies such as massive MIMO
and mmWave. However, the required high complexity and
high hardware cost are still the main hindrance to their imple-
mentation in practice. Recently, intelligent reflecting surface
(IRS) has emerged as a new and cost-effective solution for
the SPs. An IRS is generally composed of a large number
of passive elements, each of which is able to reflect the
incident signal with an adjustable phase-shift. By intelligently
tuning the phase-shifts of all elements adaptive to dynamic
wireless channels, the signals reflected by the IRS can add
constructively with non-reflected signals at the user receiver
to boost the received signal power and enhance the data
throughput at the user receiver. As such, IRS allows the SPs
to improve the spectrum and energy efficiency, extend the
network coverage and enhance the Quality of Serivce (QoS)
of the users with low cost.
Apart from the above benefits, IRS enables the SPs to
provide a new network resource and a new service to the
mobile users. In particular, the SPs can provide IRS resources
to the mobile users in addition to traditional network resources
such as antenna, spectrum, and power. Indeed, there are
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some works that have investigated the IRS resource allocation
issues. In particular, the authors in [1] consider the allocation
of transmit power and IRS resources to mobile users. The
network includes one base station (BS) and one IRS. The IRS
is divided into modules of reflection elements, i.e., reflection
modules. Then, the problem is to determine the number of
reflection modules, the corresponding passive beamforming,
and transmit power for the users to maximize the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). Note that the authors
consider the allocation of reflection modules, i.e., instead of
all the reflection elements, to the users since triggering all
the reflection elements frequently can result in the increased
latency of adjusting phase-shift. To solve this problem, the
parallel alternating direction method of multipliers (PADMM)
algorithm is used. Different from [1], the authors in [2] assume
that the BS and the IRS belong to different SPs. To maximize
the individual utility of the BS and IRS, the Stackelberg game
is proposed to jointly optimize the IRS resource price, the
transmit power, and the passive beamforming of the triggered
reflection modules. However, both the works in [1] and [2]
consider scenarios with a single IRS.
In this letter, we consider an IRS-assisted wireless network
with multiple SPs and multiple mobile users. The SPs deploy
BSs along with IRSs and provide network services to the
users. In particular, the SPs are responsible for allocating the
transmit power and IRS resources to the users for their data
transmissions. To satisfy different QoS requirements of the
mobile users, similar to other works, e.g., [1], [2], we assume
that each SP divides the transmit power and the IRS into
different power levels and reflection modules, respectively. The
SPs may set different prices for their resources, and the users
that select different SPs and services may achieve different
utilities. Due to their rationality, the users with low utilities
have an incentive to adapt their SP and service selections. In
other words, the users can dynamically change their SP and
service selection strategies over time. To model the dynamic
SP and service selection strategies of the users, we propose
to use the evolutionary game [3]. The reason for the use
of the evolutionary game is that this game is able to deal
with the problem of dynamic selection strategies of players,
i.e., the users. In particular, the players in the evolutionary
game are bounded rational, and they can adapt their strategies
gradually to reach the evolutionary equilibrium. Furthermore,
the algorithm to implement the strategy adaptation based on
the evolutionary game has a low complexity that is suitable
for the dynamic strategy selections of the users [4].
Our main contribution is as follows: we first formulate the
SP and service selection in the network as an evolutionary
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2game. In the game, the users form populations, and they
adjust their SP and service selections based on their utilities.
We then model the SP and service adaptation of the users
as replicator dynamics in the evolutionary game and analyze
the equilibrium of the evolutionary game. Finally, we provide
performance evaluation to demonstrate the consistency with
the analytical results and to validate the proposed game model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
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Fig. 1: A wireless network with multiple IRS modules.
We consider a system model as shown in Fig. 1 that consists
of a setM of M BSs and a set N of N single-antenna users.
The M BSs are assumed to belong to M service providers
(SPs), and each BS m is equipped with Lm antennas. Note
that our model can be extended to a general case in which
one SP deploys multiple BSs and IRSs. To avoid the intra-
cell interference, each SP uses time-division multiplex access
(TDMA) to deploy the IRS-enhanced communication service.
Also, frequency-division multiplex access (FDMA) is used to
avoid the inter-cell interference among the users belonging
to different BSs. Let Bm denote the bandwidth assigned to
BS m. To provide flexible services to the users, BS m has a
set Pm of Pm power levels, denoted by {Jm,1, . . . , Jm,Pm},
that the users can select for their transmissions. We assume
that Jm,1 < Jm,2 < · · · < Jm,Pm , where Jm,Pm is the
maximum power of BS m. SP m deploys an IRS, i.e., denoted
by IRS m, to improve the QoS for the users that BS m
serves. IRS m has Km reflection elements, and the IRS is
divided into Qm modules controlled by parallel switches.
Each module in IRS m consists of Em elements, and thus
Km = QmEm. One BS-IRS pair can serve multiple users,
but the user is associated with one BS-IRS pair. Moreover, the
user is allowed to select one or multiple modules, i.e., a subset
of modules, of the selected IRS. In general, given a selected
power level and bandwidth Bm, the data throughput achieved
by the user depends on the number of modules, i.e., instead
of the orders/indexes of the modules, in the selected subset.
Thus, SP m has Qm potential subsets of modules that the user
can select, and subset k, 1 ≤ k ≤ Qm, has k modules. Denote
Θm,k as the phase-shift matrix corresponding to the subset
that the user selects, i.e., subset k of IRS m. Then, Θm,k is a
diagonal matrix in which its main diagonal consists of phase-
shifts of kEm reflection elements of IRS m. In particular,
we have Θm,k = diag(θm,k,1, . . . , θm,k,kEm), where θm,k,e is
the phase-shift of reflection element e of subset k of IRS m,
θm,k,e = e
jαm,k,e , αm,k,e ∈ [0, 2pi), e = {1, . . . , kEm}. With
the assistance of subset k of IRS m, the signal received at each
user i is the sum of 1) the received signal via the direct link
and 2) the received signal via the IRS-assisted link. Thus, the
received signal at user i ∈ N when selecting subset k of IRS
m and power level Jm,j of BS m is determined as follows:
yi =
(
hHm,i + (h
IU
m,k,i)
HΘHm,kGm,k
)
wm,j,isi + ωi, (1)
where si is the data symbol intended to user i, wm,j,i ∈
CLm×1 is the beamforming vector associated with si con-
taining power level Jm,j that the user selects, hm,i ∈ CLm×1
is the vector of channels of the direct link from BS m to
user i, hIUm,k,i ∈ CKm×1 is the vector of channels of the link
from subset k of IRS m to user i, Gm,k ∈ CKm×Lm is the
vector of channels from BS m to subset k of IRS m, and
ωi is the complex additive white Gaussian noise at user i,
ωi ∼ CN (0, σ20), where σ20 is the variance. We assume that
the channel state information (CSI) of all channels involved is
perfectly known at BS m, i.e., based on the pilot signals. In
addition, IRSs are typically deployed in static environments
due to the challenging task of CSI estimation, we can also
assume that the quasi-static flat-fading model or even static
flat-fading model is applied for all channels [5]. The signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) of user i is defined as the ratio of the power
of signal targeted to user i and the noise over bandwidth Bm
as follows:
ηm,k,i =
|(hHm,i + (hIUm,k,i)HΘHm,kGm,k,i)wm,j,i|2
Bmσ20
. (2)
III. GAME FORMULATION AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
There are totally N users, M BSs, and M IRSs in the
network. SP m offers a set Pm of Pm power levels and a set
Qm of Qm subsets of IRS modules that the user can select.
In particular, one subset consists of one or multiple modules
of the IRS. Again, one module of IRS m consists of Em
elements. Without loss of generality, we assume that N users
are divided into G =
∑M
m=1 PmQm groups. Each group, say
group g, 1 ≤ g ≤ G, consists of Nm,k,j users that select IRS
m, subset k, i.e., the corresponding phase-shift matrix Θm,k,
and power level Jm,j . We can say that users in group g select
network service g. Note that when the user selects IRS m, it is
only allowed to select subsets of modules of IRS m and power
levels of BS m. We have
∑M
m=1
∑Qm
k=1
∑Pm
j=1Nm,k,j = N ,
and each user in group g selects IRS m, Θm,k, and Jm,j at
a probability of pm,k,j = Nm,k,j/N . The phase-shift matrix
of the IRS is typically optimized for a group of nearby users,
and we assume that the channel statistics are identical for those
users in the same group [4]. Therefore, the users in the group
3can be represented by an index set (m, k, j), and the expected
downlink transmission rate of the user in the group is
Rm,k,j =
Bm
pm,k,jN
log2
(
1 + ηm,k,j
)
, (3)
where ηm,k,j =
|(hHm,j+(hIUm,k,j)HΘHm,kGm,k)wm,j |2
Bmσ20
, where wm,j
refers to the beamforming vector associated with the users in
the group that selects power level Jm,j . Let vm,k,j denote the
value of unit data to the user in group g when selecting IRS
m, subset k, and power level Jm,j . Denote γIm as the price per
element in IRS m and γPm as the price per unit power. Prices
γIm and γ
P
m are set by SP m that are constant. Since users in
each group share the same resources, they should share the
resource cost. Then, the utility of the user is given by
um,k,j = vm,k,jRm,k,j −
(
γIm‖Θm,k‖0 − γPmJm,j
)
/pm,k,jN,
(4)
where the l0-norm is used to count the number of non-
zero elements of a diagonal matrix that here refers to the
number of active reflection elements of IRS m that the
user selects. The average utility of the user is um,k,j =∑M
m=1
∑Qm
k=1
∑Pm
j=1 pm,k,jum,k,j . We leverage the replicator
dynamics to model the SP and service adaptation of the users.
The replicator dynamic process of the users is expressed as a
series of ordinary differential equations as follows:
p˙m,k,j(t) =µpm,k,j(t)[um,k,j(t)− u(t)],
m ∈M, k ∈ Qm, j ∈ Pm,∀t, (5)
where p˙m,k,j(t) represents the first derivative of pm,k,j with
respect to t, and pm,k,j(t0) = p0m,k,j is the initial strategy of
the users in group g at t0. The factor µ is the learning rate of
the users that evaluates the strategy adaptation frequency.
We analyze the equilibrium of the evolutionary game de-
fined in (5). For presentation simplification, let g, 1 ≤ g ≤ G,
denote the combination of index (m, k, j). Let fg(t, pg) =
µpg(t)[ug(t)−u(t)]. Equation (5) can be re-written as follows:
p˙g(t) = fg(t, pg), pg(t0) = p
0
g, g = (1, . . . , G). (6)
THEOREM 1. [6] Suppose that fg(t, pg) and
∂fg
∂pg
(t, pg) are
continuous functions in some open rectangle {(t, pg) : 0 ≤
t ≤ τ, 0 < pg ≤ 1} that contains the point (t0, p0g). Then,
the problem (6) has a unique solution in the closed interval
of I = [t0 − h, t0 + h], where h > 0. Moreover, the Picard
iteration defined by
pl+1g (t) = p
0
g +
∫ t
t0
fg(t, p
l
g(t)) dt (7)
produces a sequence of functions plg(t) that converges to the
solution uniformly on I .
Proof. Please refer to [6] for the detailed proof.
Here, we prove that fg(t, pg) and
∂fg
∂pg
(t, pg) are continuous
functions in the rectange {(t, pg) : 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, 0 ≤ pg ≤ 1}.
Indeed, it is clear that function pg(t) =
Ng(t)
N is continuous at
every t0 ∈ [0, τ ]. Moreover, due to the static flat-fading chan-
nel model, the channel vectors hm,j(t), hIUg (t), and Gg(t) are
constant and thereby continuous at every t0 ∈ [0, τ ]. There-
fore, ηg(t) is continuous at every t0 ∈ [0, τ ], and functions
Rg(t), ug(t), and u(t) are also continuous at every t0 ∈ [0, τ ]
if pg(t0) 6= 0. Since fg(t, pg) = µpg(t)[ug(t) − u(t)] and
∂fg
∂pg
(t, pg) = µ[ug(t) − u(t)], then fg(t, pg) and ∂fg∂pg (t, pg)
are continuous functions in the open rectangle {(t, pg) : 0 ≤
t ≤ τ, 0 < pg ≤ 1}. According to Theorem (7), problems in
(6) and (5) converge to a unique solution. This is verified by
simulations in the next section.
Note that to make the decision on SP and service selections,
the users need information about the average utility, i.e.,
um,k,j , and proportion of users choosing different strategies,
i.e., pm,k,j , from the BSs. However, the up-to-date information
may not be available at the users due to the communication
latency. Therefore, at time t, the users base on the information
at time t − δ, i.e., delay for δ units of time, to make the SP
and service selections. Thus, the delayed replicator dynamic
process is
p˙m,k,j(t) =µpm,k,j(t− δ)[um,k,j(t− δ)− u(t− δ)],
m ∈M, k ∈ Qm, j ∈ Pm,∀t.
Note that as delay δ is large, the decisions of the users
based on the outdated information tend to be inaccurate. As
a result, the evolutionary game with the delayed replicator
dynamics may not converge. How to determine δ∗ such that the
evolutionary game converges is challenging. As an example,
consider a simple scenario with M = 2, and each SP m offers
one service including subset Θm and power level Jm:
THEOREM 2. The stability of the evolutionary equilibrium
with the delayed replicator dynamics can be guaranteed if
and only if
δ∗ <
pi
2µ
∑
m∈M
Bm log2(1+ηm)−γIm||Θm||0−γPmJm
N
(8)
Proof. The detailed proof can be derived by following [4]
which is omitted from here.
Theorem (2) shows that the stability of the evolutionary
equilibrium is guaranteed as the users use the information at
t < δ∗ for their decisions.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the numerical results to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic SP and service
selection in the IRS-assisted wireless network. We consider a
network with 2 SPs, 2 BSs, 2 IRSs and 100 users. The sizes
of IRS 1 and IRS 2 are 8 elements. SP 1 divides IRS 1 to 2
modules, and SP 2 does not divide IRS 2. Each BS is equipped
with 4 antennas and offers 2 power levels that the users can
select: J1,1 = 15 dBm, J1,2 = 30 dBm, J2,1 = 10 dBm,
and J2,1 = 20 dBm. As such, SP 1 offers 4 services, namely
Services 1, 2, 3, and 4, and SP 2 offers 2 services, namely
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Fig. 2: (a) Utility of user groups vs. time and (b) time to reach
the equilibrium.
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Fig. 3: (a) Proportion of the users selecting SP1 and Service 1
with different delays and (b) proportions of the users selecting
different SPs and services versus the size of IRS 2.
Services 1 and 2. All the channels suffer a Rayleigh fading,
and the path loss at the reference distance d0 = 1 m is −30
dB. Due to the obstacles, the pass loss of the direct links from
the BS to the users is much higher than those of the links
between the BS and the IRS as well as the links between
the IRS and the users, we can thus set αm,k = αm,k,j = 2,
and αm,j = 6. When the user selects a service of the SP,
the BS uses the fixed point iteration algorithm [7] to optimize
the beamforming vector and the phase-shift matrix of the IRS
subset for the user.
First, it is important to verify the equilibrium convergence
of the game scheme. Figure 2(a) shows the utilities of the
users selecting different SPs and services versus time. As seen,
the utilities of the users selecting different SPs and services
vary until the evolutionary equilibrium is reached. Also, at the
evolutionary equilibrium, the users achieve the same utility
although they select different SPs and services. The reason
is that the evolutionary equilibrium is reached only when the
utilities of the users selecting any service provided by any SP
are equal to the expected utilities of the users.
Note that the time to reach the evolutionary equilibrium can
be different depending on the learning rate µ and the number
of users N as shown in Fig. 2(b). As seen, the evolutionary
equilibrium is reached faster as the value of µ is higher. The
reason is that the frequency of the strategy adaptation of the
users is higher with the high value of µ. Moreover, for a given
value of µ, more time is required to reach the evolutionary
equilibrium as the number of users is higher.
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Fig. 4: Proportions of users selecting different SPs vs. distance
and price.
Next, we discuss the impact of information delay δ on the
proportions of users selecting different SPs and services. For
the evaluation purpose, we consider the proportion of the users
selecting Service 1 provided by SP 1 as shown in Fig. 3(a). As
seen, when δ > 0, there is a fluctuating dynamics of strategy
adaptation. The fluctuation becomes larger as δ increases, and
the service selection cannot reach the evolutionary equilibrium
as δ ≥ 750. This is due to the fact that the outdated information
makes the users’ decisions accurate.
Now, we investigate the impact of sizes of IRSs on the
proportions of users selecting different SPs and services. In
particular, we vary the size K2 of IRS 2 provided by SP 2.
Note that K2 is also the size of one module for trading since
SP 2 does not divide IRS 2 into different modules. As shown
in Fig. 3(b), as the size of IRS 2 increases, the proportions of
users selecting services provided by SP 2 increase. The reason
is that as K2 increases, the throughput and utility obtained
by the users selecting services provided by SP 2 increase.
However, as the size of IRS 2 is large, the increasing rate
tends to be slower. This is because of that the users pay a
very high resource cost as they select the services provided
by SP 2. As a result, their utilities decrease, and they tend to
select the services provided by SP 1.
We finally discuss how the mobility of the users impacts
on the SP and service selection of the users. Figure 4 shows
the proportions of users selecting different SPs as the distance
between the users and IRS 1 varies for different IRS prices
set by SP 1. As observed, for a given price, the proportion
of users selecting SP 2 increases as the distance between the
users and IRS 1 increases. The reason is that as the distance
between the users and IRS 1 increases, the throughput obtained
by the users if selecting services of SP 1 decreases. Thus, the
users are willing to select services of SP 2. Note that as SP 1
increases its service price, the utilities of the users currently
selecting services of SP 1 decrease, and thus the proportion
of users selecting SP 1 decreases as shown in the figure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this letter, we have investigated the dynamic SP and
service selection in an IRS-assisted wireless network. Specif-
ically, we have formulated a joint SP and service selection
problem as an evolutionary game. We have modeled the SP
and service adaptation of the users as replicator dynamics
5and analyzed the equilibrium of the evolutionary game. We
have provided performance evaluation to demonstrate the
consistency with the analytical results and to validate the
proposed game model.
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